Frivolous
defenses are sometimes used by defendants
to buy time, while legitimate defenses
can render the mortgage void and prevent
foreclosure
By
Anne Rand
© 11/95 & 12/95 Foreclosure
News of NJ, Inc.
During
the course of buying foreclosures,
you will uncover many stories. Some
are heart breaking bad luck stories
and some reveal schemer's who get
caught by their own deception. Each
is unique. One must have the patience
and perseverance of a detective to
distinguish between the two. One must
also draw on creativity to find the
opportunities worth pursuing while
not wasting time pursuing the dead
ends.
Researching
past foreclosure cases can add to
your knowledge base, without having
to learn through the school of hard
knocks. This article reviews cases
where the defendant presented a defense
to stop foreclosure. They reveal the
character of defendant's, plaintiff's
and the attitude of the court. Next
time you find a hot property, compare
the characters and the facts of the
case to these cases to determine the
probable outcome.
Heritage
Bank, N.A. vs. Patricia H. Ruh, 191
N.J. Super 53 (Ch. Div. 1983)
William
Buehler and his wife and Patricia
H. Ruh obtained a mortgage for $51,850
on a property at 1517 Haddonfield-Berlin
Road in June 1980. The payment, including
escrow, was $679 per month. A few
weeks later, the Buehler's conveyed
the property to Patricia Ruh for $52,900.
The Buehler's moved to Somerdale.
Patricia Ruh continued to live in
the premises and made the mortgage
payments for August, September and
October of 1980.
In
July 1980, The first correspondence
from the lender was mistakenly forwarded
to the Bueler's and the Bueler's hand
delivered the document to Patricia
Ruh. On January 1981, a delinquency
notice, was also incorrectly forwarded
to the Buehler's who hand delivered
it to Ms. Ruh.
In
February 1981, Ms. Ruh met with the
president of the lending institution
to arrange payments of $1,000 per
month until the delinquency was made
up.
At
the same time, the lender advised
her the total amount due was $3,503.54.
Ms. Ruh did not make the $1,000 a
month payment from her annual income
of $13,000.
The
original lender, who was now only
servicing the accounts, went in bankruptcy
and the files were taken over by the
mortgagee, Heritage Bank. The mortgagee/lender
sent Ms. Ruh's file to the foreclosure
department since she was already four
months behind in her payments. When
Ms. Ruh contacted Heritage Bank, she
said she had no account number and
no coupon book. The representative
told her they were in the process
of transferring files and would contact
her later. Ms. Ruh never mentioned
she was behind in her payments.
Next,
the bank sent Ms. Ruh the tax bill
for the second quarter of 1981 and
explained they could not identify
the loan number and asked her to provide
the loan number for the active mortgage.
The same correspondence happened for
the tax bill for the second quarter
of 1982.
Foreclosure
proceeding were instituted in November
1981 and Ms. Ruh was served in January
1982.
Ms.
Ruh filed a pro se (representing herself
without an attorney) answer and listed
her defense as never being offered
a reinstatement, no payment books,
invoices or notice was received. Plaintiff
never directed her to make payment
to it at any location nor informed
her that it was the mortgagee and
no contact was made by phone or mail.
Later, she changed her defense to
failure of the mortgagee to follow
HUD/FHA procedures which should prevent
the foreclosure action and charges
the mortgagee with unconscionable
conduct to preclude it from relief
in equity.
The
FHA/HUD procedures do not supersede
the state laws regarding foreclosure.
The procedures outline the steps for
recasting the mortgage, allow for
special forbearance relief, and assignment
to FHA to avoid foreclosure and present
options to the defendant. The court
concluded "The guidelines in
their present form, therefore, cannot
be used to require the mortgagees
to pursue the alternatives listed
therein, and, accordingly, do not
give rise to a claim of a duty owed
or a remedy." In addition, the
procedure handbook is a guide for
the relations between the mortgagee/lender
and the government. They provide no
claim or duty or remedy to the defendant
/ homeowner. However, the court has
previously ruled "that even though
the handbook does not impose legal
obligation upon the mortgagees, it
does not preclude foreclosure court
from allowing mortgagors to raise
non-compliance with the handbook as
a defense to a 'quick' foreclosure.
Ms. Ruh case was not a quick foreclosure;
since the default occurred in November
1980 and the foreclosure was not commenced
until November 1981.
The
behavior of Ms. Ruh is contrasted
with the facts of another case, Associated
East Mortgage and Mr. Young. Mr. Young
paid his mortgage for four years.
During a strike, his income was reduced
to $50 a week and he paid his mortgage
from savings until it was depleted.
Immediately after the strike, Mr.
Young also informed Associated of
his circumstances and requested a
reduction in payments, which was refused.
Eventually, Associated agreed to a
forbearance agreement where an increase
in monthly payments would make up
the missed payments. Mr. Young was
only able to make one of these payments.
Associated
instituted foreclosure and the next
month the strike ended. Mr. Young
resumed his regular payments which
were placed in escrow pending the
outcome of the foreclosure action.
The
Court considered Associated's conduct
as "unconscionable" by not
following the HUD handbook. As a result,
Associated did not have "clean
hands" and was not entitled to
foreclose on the mortgage.
Mr.
Young was proactive in contacting
the bank and making every effort to
pay his mortgage during difficult
circumstances and had a track record
of timely payments. Ms. Ruh, on the
other hand, only made three payments
and made no attempt to contact the
lender after four months in default.
Ms. Ruh personally knew the bank president
from contact through her real estate
business, but did not contact him
for four months. When the tax bill
was sent to Ms. Ruh, she responded
that no account was assigned but did
not mention she was eight months behind
in payments. Ms. Ruh took no action
to correct the misdirected mail at
the post office or inform the mortgagee/lender
about the conveyance of the property.
Ms.
Ruh lived in the property for two
years and made no payments toward
the mortgage or escrow. She took no
action to clarify the mix-up which
occurred when the servicing was transferred
to the mortgagee. Since Ms. Ruh did
not act in good faith and the mortgagee
actions were not unconscionable, the
court decided foreclosure was justified.
The principal balance on the mortgage
was $51,798.71. The escrow due was
$1,941.21. Interest over the period
was $12,356.03 and late charges over
21 months were $202.90. The total
judgment was $66,163.85 plus other
costs, attorney fees and interest.
The
observant reader will note, the original
mortgage amount was $51,850 and after
two years, the final judgment was
over $66,000. It is doubtful the property
appreciated to $66,000 over two years.
Therefore, foreclosure buyers should
have a complete understanding of market
values and pursue purchases as soon
as possible in the foreclosure process
to minimize other costs and penalties.
Summit
Trust Co. vs. Chichester, 233 N.J.
Super 417 (App. Div. 1989)
In
the fall of 1986, John and Sally Chichester
decided to purchase a new home at
10 Thrumont Road and sell their old
home at 10 Washington Ave. In October
1986, they paid $24,500 as a deposit
on the new house and scheduled closing
for January 1987.
The
old house did not sell as quickly
as anticipated and the Chichester's
applied for a "bridge loan"
from Summit Trust. They had a firm
commitment from Citicorp to finance
their new house. The bridge loan was
temporary, once the old house was
sold the bridge loan would be repaid.
A business associate co-signed the
bridge loan with the Chichester's
in January 1987. Later, the defendants
were notified the documents previously
filled out were "filled out wrong".
The Chichester's were asked to sign
new documents for the bridge loan.
Since closing on the new house was
a few days away, they needed the proceeds
quickly and signed the documents.
The
bridge loan required interest only
payments for two months at $420 and
a lump sum payment of $42,000 in April
1987, the loan was secured by mortgages
on both houses.
The
defendants made interest payments
until August 1987, but did not make
the principal payment due in April
1987. Summit Trust filed the foreclosure
complaint in August 1987.
The
defendants conceded they were in default
under the loan but argued that Summit
did not provide the necessary disclosures
under Regulation Z and The Truth in
Lending Act. Summit did not dispute
that the disclosures were not provided,
but argued they were not required
under this type of loan.
Regulation
Z requires the lender to disclose,
before consummation of the loan 1)
the annual percentage rate 2) the
finance charge 3) total amount financed
4) the total payments to be made 5)
the payment schedule. In addition,
the consumer is granted 3 business
days to rescind a "credit transaction
in which a security interest is or
will be retained or acquired in a
consumer's principal dwelling..."
If the required notices are not provided
to the consumer, then the consumer
has three years to rescind the transaction.
When the consumer rescinds, the money
is returned but no interest or finance
charge is paid.
The
court concluded the bridge loan was
temporary financing, not a "residential
mortgage transaction" but was
subject to the right to recession
notification. Since Summit never provided
notice of the right to recession,
the defendant can void the underlying
mortgage.
This
case illustrates the importance of
obtaining competent legal advise.
This applies to the buyer, seller
or investor. While every effort should
be made to read all contracts and
legal papers, an attorney should always
be consulted. The attorney probably
would have advised the client of the
repercussions of the bridge loan.
Later, the attorney did present a
valid defense for the client.
Prudential
Insurance Company of America vs. Jackson
270 N.J. Super 510 (App. Div. 1994)
In
December 1968, Mr. Jackson and his
wife purchased a residence at 126
Wade Street in Jersey City. The price
of the home was $22,800 and the total
amount was mortgaged by Commercial
Mortgage Company (sold to Prudential
on December 30, 1968) and guaranteed
by the Veterans Administration. The
mortgage was for 25 years and included
an escrow for taxes and insurance.
Prudential used Metmor Financial Inc.
as it's servicing agent. On January
19, 1990, Metmor paid $14,333.25 to
Jersey City to satisfy a sewer and
water lien. In February 1990, Mr.
Jackson was informed he was to pay
the amount of the lien in 6 monthly
installments. Therefore, his payments
would increase from $385 per month
to $1,966.76. Mr. Jackson paid $385
for his March 1990 payment. The servicer
applied the entire payment to the
sewer and water lien debt. Mr. Jackson
protested and stopped making any payments.
The
mortgagee, Prudential Insurance Co.,
filed a foreclosure complaint as of
March 1990. The principal mortgage
debt in February 1990 was $6,480.46
not including late fees, taxes or
the sewer/water lien.
Mr.
Jackson answered the complaint with
three defenses; unclean hands, unfair
dealing and failure to comply with
VA procedures. Prudential filed a
motion to strike the answer and continue
with the foreclosure complaint and
filed proof of debt as of October
1991, at $24,764.25. Eventually, Prudential
motion was granted and on July 1993
a judgment was entered for $31,476.34.
Later,
the judgment for foreclosure was reversed
since the motion to strike the defenses
was improperly granted. The defendant
raised question of material fact which
was not heard.
In
this writers opinion, it was unfair
for Prudential to expect Mr. Jackson
to make up over $14,000 in 6 months.
Mr. Jackson could have obtained a
new mortgage loan for the amount of
the sewer and water liens plus the
principal balance, payable over many
years. It is likely, the property
appreciated since purchased and Mr.
Jackson had proven his ability to
make reasonable payments. As an investor,
I would have provided the funds for
a new first mortgage.
Somerset
Trust Company vs. Sternberg, 238 N.J.
Super 279 (ch. Div 1989)
When
the Plaintiff/Lender prevails in a
foreclosure case, the lender is allowed
to include legal fees as part of the
judgment (R. 4:42-9). The amount of
the fees are computed using a formula.
The purpose of this rule is to encourage
lenders to loan funds for mortgages
and allows the lender to recover legal
fees if they are forced to foreclose.
In
this case, the lender, who has already
prevailed in the foreclosure, seeks
to recover additional legal fees from
the defendant due to the filing a
"frivolous defenses", (N.J.S.A.
2A:15-59.1). The defendant's motion
contained no legal or equitable defenses
to the foreclosure. The purpose of
this punitive statute is to discourage
defendants from making frivolous defenses
which delay justice, waste time and
money and clogs the court system.
The
court observed that many foreclosure
actions include a defense filing by
the defendant but fail to respond
to the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment. The court concludes this
is a delay tactic by the defendant
to postpone the inevitable.
The
plaintiff sought over $3,525. The
defendant maintained only $850 is
attributable to legal expenses incurred
as a result of the frivolous defenses.
The judge agreed and awarded $850
to the plaintiff due to the frivolous
defenses.
It
is interesting to speculate, the $850
penalty assessed against the defendant
for the frivolous defense may have
been worthwhile to the defendant.
The court observed the defense was
a method used to delay the eventual
foreclosure. In this case, assume
for example, the 'frivolous defense'
delayed the foreclosure for only 2
additional months. If alternative
housing (or their mortgage payment)
cost more than $425 per month, they
actually saved money by filing the
defense rather than losing the home
two months earlier. I am sure the
court did not speculate about the
facts this way, but it would also
support why so may defendants file
a "frivolous defense" and
defeat the purpose of the statute.
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